patterns which embrace transactional immunity? Which approach best assists law enforcement, and which makes for fairer, more efficient justice? Such inquiries pose vital criminal law issues today. They will be considered in this article, with some discussion taking place in the context of the Uniform Rule on witness immunity. That rule provides an excellent vehicle for reviewing the proper scope of witness immunity, a most controversial topic, and it raises many other contemporary issues in the immunity field.
THE UNIFORM RULE AND HISTORICAL MILEPOSTS Rule 732(b) of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a witness who is ordered to answer a question over a valid claim of privilege "may not be prosecuted or subjected to criminal penalty .
for or on account of any transaction or matter concerning which, in compliance with the order, he gave answer or produced information."' By The chairman of this special committee pointed out that the rules were prepared by the committee, its reporters and staff director. The proposed legislation was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1974 , and is recommended for adoption by the states. The rule provides:
Rule 732. [Immunity.] (a) Compelling production of information despite assertion of privilege. In any proceeding under these Rules, if a witness refuses to answer or produce information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, the [district] court, unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration of justice, shall compel him to answer or produce information if:
(1) The prosecuting attorney makes a written request to the [district] court to order the witness to answer or produce information, notwithstanding his claim of privilege; and (2) The [district] court informs the witness that by so doing he will receive immunity under subdivision (b). (b) Nature and scope of immunity. If, but for this Rule, the witness would have been privileged to withhold the answer or information given, and he thus embracing the concept of transactional immunity, the Uniform Rule follows a long-standing American approach in this field.
The privilege against self-incrimination has deep roots in English and American history, ' and immunity laws represent an attempt to balance society's need for testimony with an individual's right to silence.' American statutes dating to the midnineteenth century provided for broad transactional immunity. 8 When Congress tried to narrow the scope in one enactment, the Supreme Court found the provision unconstitutional.' This 1892 decision by the Court indicated that an immunity statute, in order to pass constitutional muster, must provide absolute immunity against future prosecution regarding the offense to which the question relates. 15 complies with an order under subdivision (a) compelling him to answer or produce information, he may not be prosecuted or subjected to criminal penalty in the courts of this State for or on account of any transaction or matter concerning which, in compliance with the order, he gave answer or produced information.
(c) Exception for perjury and contempt. A witness granted immunity under this Rule may nevertheless be subjected to criminal penalty for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering, failing to answer, or failing to produce information in compliance with the order. 6 Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REv. 470, 471 (1974) .
'United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 , 1342 (2d Cir. 1974 .
'The Compulsory Testimony Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § § 1-3, 11 Stat. 155, provided for full and complete immunity from prosecution in connection with any fact or act communicated by the witness in compelled testimony. The protection was so wide that it sometimes resulted in "immunity baths," a witness immunizing himself by volunteering incriminating information in a formal proceeding. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 , 1579 (1963 ("Most immunity acts grant immunity broadly ....
). On the history of immunity grants, see Note, Judicial Enforcement of Nonstatutory "Immunity Grants": Abrogation by Analogy, 25 HAST. L.J. 435, 443-50 (1974) S. 52 (1964) . Murphy held that where a defendant is compelled to answer questions about a crime in one jurisdiction, a second jurisdiction may not use his answers or the "fruits" of same to prosecute him. However, the second jurisdiction might prosecute if other evidence of the crime was available there. However, the Murphy Court did not address itself to the scope of prosecution in the immunizing jurisdiction, this being the question treated in the 1970 Crime Control Act at the federal level. Comment, supra note 6, at 475. See HASTINGS, supra note 8, at 461 (effect of Murphy was to create an exclusionary rule based on the fifth amendment which operates as a complete bar to use of the compelled testimony by any jurisdiction).
What if different immunity standards apply? Suppose the compelling state granted transactional immunity, while the federal government follows the "use/derivative use" pattern. May the federal government prosecute or is it bound to honor the complete bar imposed by the state? See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964) ; People v. Gentile, 47 App. Div. 2d 930, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 69 (1975) (although New York grants full transactional immunity, it need not insure federal transactional immunity to a witness).
Murphy ordained no prosecution by federal authorities on evidence gathered under a state grant of immunity. The other side of the coin was mentioned in United States v. Watkins, 505 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1974), which observed that states are similarly bound when an immunized witness has testified in a federal proceeding.
"See note 12 supra.
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Control Act provided that no testimony compelled under a court order, including information derived therefrom, could be used against a witness in a criminal case.6 However, the witness could be prosecuted for the crime he was required to talk about on the basis of other, independent evidence. In view of its own prior opinions on witness immunity as well as conflicting lower federal court decisions on the constitutionality of section 6002,17 the Supreme Court reviewed that section in Kastigar v. United States. 18 Kastigar involved witnesses who had been granted immunity and were ordered to answer questions by the United States District Court. They refused. The court held them in contempt. The witnesses claimed that the immunity they had been granted under section 6002 was not coextensive with their privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the important question whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom ("use and derivative use" immunity), or whether it is necessary to grant immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates ("transactional" immunity The Court then turned to the question of whether a constitutionally sound immunity statute must embrace the complete immunity standard recognized in the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock. 21 The Kastigar Court decided that the absolute immunity language of Counselman was unnecessary to the Court's decision in that case, was not binding authority, and that "use/derivative use" immunity could be incorporated in federal laws. Section 6002 was constitutionally unassailable. In approving that section, however, the Supreme Court warned that heavy burdens must rest upon prosecutors seeking to prosecute witnesses who have been compelled to testify. In such later prosecutions for crimes related to the witness' testimony, there must be a showing that the government's evidence is untainted by the preceding compelled testimony. The Court's view in this regard has created intriguing developments in subsequent litigation. The government carries a distinct burden: it may proceed only on independent evidence. The view of the Court is stated:
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independen of the compelled testimony.
... One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to'the government the heavy burden of "Id. at 446-47 (footnotes omitted). "See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. 22
ADMINISTERING THE KASTIGAR STANDARD:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS It has been suggested that a prosecutor who gathers evidence under a grant of immunity will find little difference between use and transactional immunity.
2 " There is substantial difficulty imposed on the prosecutor in demonstrating that the government's case springs entirely from evidence derived independently of the immunized testimony. Illustrative is the case of United States v. Strachan. 2 4 There, the U.S. Attorney sought to prosecute an individual to whom use immunity had been granted. The government ultimately dismissed the prosecution. The Strachan case was one of the few where a prosecutor tried to prosecute someone in these circumstances. Apparently the difficulty of making the requisite showing of non-utilization of immunized testimony impedes most potential prosecutions."
22406 U.S. at 460-62. On the measure of proof necessary to negate "taint" see Comment, supra note 6, at 486, which argues for the applicability of a heavier standard than mere preponderance of the evidence. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (Supp. 1975) The government appealed. On review, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that "[o]nce immunity is shown, the prosecutor has the burden of demonstrating that its use of the immunized testimony has not tainted any aspect of the case up to indictment and will not do so during trial."
STARKMAN,
However, the order dismissing the indictment was reversed because of the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of taint. The reviewing court ruled that where a prosecutor claims independent evidence of a witness/defendant's involvement in a crime, the trial court should not dismiss the government's case without giving the prosecutor a hearing to prove lack of taint.28 A strong rule was announced. The trial court has "no discretion" to order a summary dismissal.
The appellate court described the choices before a trial judge as follows:
A trial court faced with a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because of immunity granted by Federal or State Governments has basically four alternative procedures for determining whether or not the proposal, prosecutors would be required to go through a certification procedure before a witness testifies, and in any subsequent prosecution of such a witness the government would be restricted to using only previously certified evidence. prosecution's evidence is tainted: (I) it can hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing; (2) it can hold a taint hearing during the trial as the questioned evidence is offered; (3) it can hold a post-trial hearing to determine taint; or (4) it can use a combination of these alternatives.
2 9
The hearing procedures suggested by the De Diego court appear to be well conceived. Apparently, however, other circuits have employed more summary alternatives in which the hearing deemed so necessary by De Diego was not required when the request for such relief is made by the accused. demonstrates the sometimes confusing course of the law. A witness testified before a special grand jury. Later he was indicted for a conspiracy around which several grand jury questions had centered. The defendant requested an evidentiary hearing, with the burden resting on the government to show the indictment was not tainted by the prior grant of "use" immunity. The trial court analyzed the questions which the government had put to the witness at the grand jury proceeding, found that the questions revealed a good deal of information obtained independent of the defendant's answers, and concluded that it was "clear from the government's questions that it had obtained considerable information about the defendant's alleged illegal activities from Frank Bychowski, an unindicted co-conspirator, prior to the defendant's immunized testimony."
' 3 1 An evidentiary hearing was deemed unnecessary, and the defendant's motion was denied. The court stated:
Thus, the particular facts of the instant case do not necessitate an evidentiary hearing at this time as to whether the instant indictment was the product of an independent evidence source which is exclusive of any information or leads obtained from the defend- Under the peculiar circumstances and facts attendant to the instant indictment, the requested evidentiary hearing is not required in the interests ofjustice.
To grant an evidentiary hearing in this case would only serve to allow the defendant "pre-trial discovery" which has already been denied by this Court. Interpretation by the United States Supreme Court may well be in order to clarify the "when" and "whether" aspects of hearing procedures. Outside of the most exceptional cases, it would appear prudent to follow the lead of De Diego and to conduct an evidentiary hearing whenever the taint question appears. Protective orders could be adopted to safeguard from disclosure to the defendant any information which might threaten the safety of 2d 212 (1972) , creates certain problems where, as here, two states and the federal government grant one conspirator immunity in order to force testimony against the other conspirators, that testimony is then either passed around or made public, and finally there is an attempt to try the immunized person jointly with the other conspirators. It is true that such a trial is not impossible, but where, as here, the prosecutor advises the court against severance and presses upon it only the alternative of what would surely have been a prolonged taint hearing claiming the energies of all the parties to the impending trial just before it was to get underway, I believe that the district judge has an inherent power to dismiss the indictment with prejudice; and I would affirm its exercise in this instance. 31 ceedings, see United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974 ), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975 . The Braasch case involved payoffs to Chicago police by tavern owners. The members of the police department who were involved claimed they had a right to be present at hearings granting immunity to several dozen bar owners. The court held they had no right to be present nor any right to obtain the identity of government witnesses by being furnished copies of orders granting immunity. 16-18, 20-21 (1976) Respecting the debate over "use" versus transactional immunity, one writer has suggested that "use" immunity may make a witness' testimony more credible, or perhaps seem so. See Thornburgh, supra note 16, at 5. A significant Occasionally, a defendant will be successfully prosecuted after having given immunized testimony. If only a miniscule number of defendants may be successfully prosecuted after a grant of "use" immunity, is a change in the federal immunity pattern indicated? Put differently, is an ornate procedural and hearing network justified when "prosecutors say that there is little difference between use immunity and transactional immunity? The drafters of the new Uniform Rule on witness immunity thought so, since they concluded that considerations of effective law enforcement dictated transactional immunity. The drafting committee question remains: Isn't there a strong motivation for the witness to "shade" trial evidence in favor of the government in order to please a prosecutor who continues to hold the hammer of prosecution over his head? Indeed, isn't it human for a suspect/witness to "go overboard" in trying to help authorities who can still prosecute him under a "use" immunity scheme? As for the suggestion that such a witness might be prosecuted for perjury, a prosecutor's motivation to vigorously do so would seem diminished when the witness' greatest error was in advancing the government's case too zealously.
It has been urged that a disadvantage of transactional immunity is that a witness can shield himself from subsequent prosecution simply by mentioning pertinent past criminal acts in the course of giving immunized testimony. Thornburgh, supra, at 21. However, one major safeguard against witness abuse involves the principle of "responsiveness." If the witness' answer is not responsive to the question, which may be narrowly framed, immunity may properly be denied. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972 discussed the views of a committee member who had special expertise in the immunity area. This member maintained that some prosecutors prefer transactional immunity because the witness who is only granted "use" immunity is likely to tell less than one testifying under a transactional grant.
3 " A related point had been made earlier when the 1970 Crime Control Act was debated. The then-Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation opposed "use" immunity. Concerned that section 6002 of the pending 1970 Crime Control Act might be construed as replacing the transactional immunity provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Chairman forecast that such a result would "make it more difficult for the Corporation to obtain information from individuals that relates to the risks being assumed by the Corporation in insuring bank deposits." UNIFORi RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) . Some other arguments made in the Uniform Rule discussion on behalf of transactional immunity include: (1) under a use immunity scheme, even though the compelled testimony is not used in evidence, knowledge of it better equips the prosecutor to probe the defendant's direct testimony; (2) if evidence is located by means of the coerced testimony, there is a general reluctance of courts to vigorously enforce the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine; (3) analogizing immunized testimony to coerced confessions, and thereby excluding the witness' statements as well as the "fruits of the poisonous tree," provides inadequate protection when dealing with evidence secured under immunity grants. In connection with this last point the Supreme Court in Kastigar had cited Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), a confession case, to support its view that excluding the witness' testimony from further use as well as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" provided proper protection. The Comment to the Uniform Rule termed the analogy to confessions unsound. To dismiss a prosecution completely because a single policeman conducted, perhaps in haste, an unconstitutional interrogation would be a high price to pay for the constable's blunder. On the other hand, the rule drafters urge that the prosecutor granting immunity makes a calm and calculated judgment as to whether to grant it. In such circumstances, a ban on prosecution (where the immunity is transactional) occurs not as a result of blunder or happenstance but rather as the product of reasoned choice.
' In other cases, witnesses may occasionally face consequences more fearsome than jail. See Judge Bauer's discussion of witnesses who are threatened with death if they talk. Bauer, supra note 16, at 11. A witness may be understandably frightened by the prospect of talking, then being prosecuted and sent to the jail which houses the culprit he was forced to testify against. Again, if sent to another institution, friends of the initial defendant might be imprisoned in the witness' place of incarceration.
As a former consultant in the field of legislative drafting, the author of this Journal article has encountered certain reactions similar to those disclosed in the preceding paragraph. While police and prosecutor opinions vary, there are some who maintain that complete immunity may be necessary in important cases to persuade a member of a criminal gang that the government is "playing fair." A critically needed witness will sometimes suffer contempt punishment rather than speak, unless he is assured that he will not be prosecuted after he talks. Of course, prosecutors frequently make informal arrangements of this kind by simply promising not to prosecute a witness who cooperates. But occasionally the witness wants something more. The desire for this "something more" might be a compelling motivation where the prosecutor is up for re-election. The prosecutor's vulnerability at the polls is a point of keen concern to the potential witness. If the "something more" desired by the witness can be given through transactional immunity, does the desirability of having it available suggest a need for it on the statute books? Some authorities think it does.
4 " One commentator concluded the point this way:
The impact of Kastigar is still uncertain, but it has been suggested that an anomalous result might be expected. Quite possibly, section 6002, designed to achieve effective law enforcement against organized crime, may lead to precisely the opposite result. A witness may find no incentive to talk where he can still be prosecuted and may prefer the consequences of a contempt finding. Testimony in such a situation may lead to animosity on the part of compatriots and an accompanying fear on the part of the witness of adverse non-legal consequences. Without the added incentive inherent in the removal of all criminal sanctions, silence may indeed be golden. In the Demopoulos case, the court further instructed the jury "that in weighing the testimony of each witness it should consider his relationship to the Government or the defendant and any interest that he had in the outcome of the case." The jury charge also described the scope and extent of immunity granted witnesses Boznos and Crispino under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). 506 F.2d at 1179. See People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 459, 31 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1940) (accomplice required promise of immunity for his testimony; court refers to this as one of the reasons why the statement was open to "gravest suspicion"; in such cases it is necessary, to warrant conviction of defendant, to have corroborative evidence independent of accomplice's testimony). While some courts may give only the general credibility instruction when an immunized witness testifies, in others a special jury charge may be employed. In 1 E. DEVITT & C.
BLACKNMAR, supra, § 12.02, at 255 an illustrative instruction appears:
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant for pay, or for immunity from punishment, or for personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must determine whether the informer's testimony has been affected by interest, or by prejudice against defendant.
approved by the United States Court of Appeals. As to the "informer" request the reviewing court stated:
Boznos and Crispino were not informers, for they testified only when ordered to do so under grants of use immunity. In closing this matter, we cannot fault the trial judge for the inclusion of the following sentence in the immunity instruction: However, the fact that this government witness was granted immunity also is not a justification under the law for your finding a defendant not guilty if you find that his guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt from your consideration of the evidence. 44
Regarding the issue of final arguments, some latitude must be given defense counsel. It has been held that the defense is free to urge that an immunized accomplice who testified against his client may be selfishly seeking to protect himself (or another), as the inferences from the evidence in a particular case may suggest. 41 Of course, counsel is restricted to drawing inferences from the record and may not "testify" during closing argument. The appropriate limits of a jury argument in a criminal case have been considered in various trial standards, and the subject has been the object of comment in numerous appellate opinions. Further, during the evidence-taking phase of the case the witness who testifies for the government is open to impeachment on matters demonstrating "bias, prejudice, interest, or the willingness of the witness to be unscrupulous in giving testimony." 203, 213 (1972) . See also People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973) (promise of immunity does not make accomplice's testimony inadmissible, but where immunity agreement depends on conviction of person against whom testimony is sought, possibility of false evidence is too great and prosecutors may not bargain for such a result). 48On the latitude allowed a cross-examiner to question and impeach in a criminal case see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (attack on a witness' credibility may be While recognizing the right of defendants to attack the credibility of immunized witnesses, at the same time it should be noted that the immunized witness operates under constraints designed to insure the reliability of his testimony. The witness is himself subject to later prosecution for perjury. In an effort to insure accurate trial testimony from immunized witnesses, the Uniform Rule incorporates a long accepted approach in immunity legislation by providing: "A witness granted immunity under this Rule may nevertheless be subjected to criminal penalty for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering, failing to answer, or failing to produce information in compliance with the order."
49
Suppose the witness who is testifying at trial is not a former associate (turned state's evidence) of the defendant, but is instead the defendant himself. Special impeachment problems are raised when the defendant is confronted with a prior trial transcript. The situation comes up this way: If the defendant had previously testified in a related proceeding under a grant of "use" immunity by appearing as a government witness against a co-conspirator, he may himself be charged with a similar offense. Under the "use" immunity statutes the transcript of his prior testimony is not usable as an admission against the defendant in the government's case-in-chief. But if the accused takes the stand in his own defense, is the prior transcript usable for another purpose, namely to impeach his later testimony? Some commentators have suggested that statements compelled under an immunity grant made by revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness). The preceding text and footnote references deal with the law applicable to cross-examination. Tactics and techniques of examination are reviewed in Wolfson, supra note 32, at 23, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] , supra note 5. The provision was taken from the older MODEL STATE WITNESS IMMUNITY ACT (1952) . On using the record of testimony given under an immunity grant to prosecute for perjury, as well as a description of the penalties for giving false testimony, see Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1975 Hockenberry negates the claimed right of the government to impeach an accused who is on trial for one crime (crime A) by using immunized testimony taken from him in connection with a separate crime (crime B). The court held that such compelled admissions of wrongdoing obtained under a grant of immunity could not be used later to discredit the witness' effort to defend himself against a charge of some other wrongdoing. One situation contemplated under the foregoing rule involves statements made by a defendant who is attempting to plead guilty. In such a case, the defendant must demonstrate a factual basis for the guilty plea. However, the judge may rule that the offered plea is not understandingly made, refuse to accept it, and set the case for trial. The factual statements made by the accused during the unsuccessful attempt to plead guilty may later conflict with the account of the crime which he gives during the trial. Just as rule 11 (e) (6) makes these plea-related statements inadmissible, so also it may be urged that immunized testimony should not be allowed for impeachment. At the very least, federal rule 11(e) (6) demonstrates that Harris v. New York 5 will not be relentlessly applied in all situations to allow impeachment by prior contradictory statements. Coupling the principle recognized in rule 11(e) (6) with the Kastigar language that use immunity prohibits prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect,"5 one might reasonably conclude that prior immunized testimony is not available to impeach a criminal defendant. A final trial problem concerns the witness who initially refuses to testify because of potential selfincrimination, and then, when immunized, continues 54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) (emphasis added 410-6, 410 [011 (1975) . 56406 U.S. at 453. In addition, Harris v. New York allows use of an arrested person's voluntary incriminating statements to impeach. In contrast, frequently missing from immunized testimony is any aspect of voluntariness.
In connection with the suggested conclusion that immunized testimony is unavailable for impeachment, a further question must be raised. May the prosecutor make nonevidentiary use of such testimony, either in forming subsequent charges against the witness or in planning crossexamination at trial? While United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971 ), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972 , indicates a negative answer, it was a pre-Kastigar case, and some commentators view it as being undercut by Kastigar. See Comment, supra note 6, at 479-80.
to resist because of the risk of foreign prosecution. This problem might come up under either transactional immunity statutes or use immunity schemes. Even with a national grant of immunity, the threat of foreign prosecution may be very real in certain cases. If the fifth amendment protects a witness from incriminating himself under foreign laws, an immunized witness might still refuse to testify, pointing to the incapacity of any immunizing authority to protect him completely. Of course, the problem will not arise in the ordinary felony. But some conduct may transgress both domestic and foreign laws, and thus raise the issue of foreign prosecution.
This question has been largely sidestepped by the courts. Raised in 1974 by an American citizen who was deported from Mexico, the United States Court of Appeals did not review the full sweep of the fifth amendment. " The citizen had been cited for contempt for failing to answer questions before an American grand jury. The questions concerned his transportation of marijuana to the United States from Mexico. He had been granted immunity in the United States, but claimed the immunity was insufficient to protect him from prosecution in Mexico. The appellate court's response was that grand jury proceedings are secret, and "we cannot assume that the rule will be broken and the proceedings disclosed to the Mexican government." 8 Thus, he had no right to refuse to cooperate. In other opinions, courts have artfully avoided a determination of the issue by finding no substantial danger of foreign incrimination in the compelled testimony. " There will be future cases, however, in which the testimony poses a real threat of foreign prosecution, thus eliminating the "no substantial danger" ground for resolving the case. This might occur in a situation where a witness' actual testimony at trial is needed so the case cannot be simply resolved on the secrecy ground. When such hard cases arise, intensive scrutiny will have to be given the scope of the fifth amendment. Under one view, "when the threat of incrimination arises under foreign law, it seems that the privilege would be well served by holding it applicable in that context." '0
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on significant trial problems connected with the administration of witness immunity. This focus appears to be deserved in view of the complexity and importance of the pretrial and trial issues involved. Other questions which might have been discussed include the application of immunity principles to congressional and other 6 2 proceedings, comparisons between statutory and nonstatutory immunity, 63 and whether a potential "Comment, supra note 6, at 492, citing In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972 . The Cardassi case concluded that when a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution existed, the rationale of Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), operated to bar compulsory disclosure. Authorities are reviewed in the trial court opinion in the Weir case discussed in the text accompanying note 57. In re Weir, 377 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Cal.), affd, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1038 (1974) . See Bauer, supra note 16, at 13. 6 On the special problems of representing congressional witnesses, see 4 S. BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECH- NIQUES § 71.11 (1975) . Sections 6001-6005 of the 1970 Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 6001-05 (1970) ("use" immunity), cover witnesses who appear before Congress and grand juries as well as those who appear in court. 6 The "use" immunity provision of the 1970 Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) covers grand jury as well as other proceedings. On representing a grand jury witness, especially one who has been granted immunity, see I R. CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § § 601, 609 (1975) . The grand jury setting has given rise to the issue of what grand jury requests may be resisted by a witness under the fifth amendment. Such things as voice or handwriting exemplars are not protected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Hawkins, 501 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) . As to whether a grand jury witness must be advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, see United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. (1974 ), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975 . 6As when the prosecutor negotiates an agreement to testify as part of a plea bargain with a guilty-pleading defendant. See HASTINGS, supra note 8, which suggests that any abuses in this process, such as the prosecutor making unauthorized immunity grants, might be ameliorated by disclosing of plea agreements in open court. Id. at 443. Under new amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such reforms have been initiated. FED. R. CR51. P. 11 (e) (1)-(4) now provides:
(1) In general.-The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the [Vol. 67 
